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Article 3

The Justice and the Jury
Jason Mazzone †
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judges who work with juries—trial judges—tend to
think very highly of them. 1 Studies show that trial judges
almost unanimously believe that juries reach fair verdicts;
most trial judges report that if they personally were involved in
a criminal or civil case they would want it to be decided by a
jury. 2 Judge William L. Dwyer, a judge for fifteen years on the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington in Seattle, considered jurors his “courtroom
companions” who routinely produced “fair and honest
verdicts.” 3 Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa states that it
†
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1
The favorable views held by trial judges contrast with commentators’
frequent criticisms of juries. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (“‘[T]he jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur.
Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in
various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for
deciding controversies between persons?’”) (quoting Erwin Griswold, Dean’s Report 5-6
(1963) (on file with Harvard Law School Library Special Collections)); Steven I.
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U.
L. REV. 190, 190 (1990) (“Numerous examples support the contention that a jury
selected at random sometimes serves as an incompetent decisionmaker.”); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1497
(1999) (“Well-publicized instances of crazy jury trials—interminable, uncivil, lawless,
resulting in outlandish verdicts and other egregious miscarriages of justice, or all these
things at once—have convinced some observers that the American system is grossly
inefficient.”). But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 163 (1986)
(“[T]he hard facts indicate that on the whole the jury behaves responsibly and
rationally.”); William Glaberson, A Study’s Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of
Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9 (reporting from a study of nearly 9,000 trials
that judges award punitive damages about as often and in the same proportion as do
juries).
2
See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 168485 (2001) (reporting results of a survey of federal and state trial judges in Texas).
3
WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at xi, xiii
(2002).
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would be “catastrophic for the nation” if civil juries were to
disappear. 4 According to Nebraska trial judge Lyle Strom:
“Out of hundreds of jury trials, I can count on fewer than the
fingers of one hand the verdicts that I thought made no sense.” 5
How many of us would say the same about the decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court or other appellate courts?
The justices of the Supreme Court do not sit with juries
and therefore observe their work only by reading trial
transcripts—transcripts in cases in which the losing party is
arguing that the outcome of the case was flawed. Yet Supreme
Court decisions heavily influence the work of juries: the tasks
juries will be called upon to perform 6 and how labor will be
divided up between judges and juries; 7 how jurors are selected; 8
the evidence juries see and the arguments they hear; 9 the
4
Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE
306, 308 (2005).
5
Quoted in DWYER, supra note 3, at 137.
6
For example, in the modern era at least, “in the absence of express or
implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues
of fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions by the court.”
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
7
For example, in the criminal context, the Court has held that defendants
have a right to have a jury decide every element of the crime. See United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (“We have held that [the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments] require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the
defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)). A series of recent cases limit the ability of
judges to make their own factual findings at sentencing. See United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 230-32, 34 (2005) (holding that Sixth Amendment was violated by
imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
based on the sentencing judge’s determination of facts other than a prior conviction
that were not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (invalidating state sentencing law that allowed judge to
impose sentence beyond standard range upon finding aggravating factors, in this case
that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89
(2002) (holding unconstitutional state statute that allowed the trial judge sitting alone
to decide whether there existed aggravating factors to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt”). See generally Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the
Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 795 (2005) (concluding that “the [Supreme] Court has
been more generous in its allocation of power to the criminal jury under the Sixth
Amendment as compared to its allocation of power to the civil jury under the Seventh
Amendment”).
8
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely on the basis
of their race violates equal protection).
9
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-97 (1993)
(holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires trial judges to act as gatekeepers
to ensure that scientific expert testimony presented to a jury is both reliable and
relevant).
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consequences of jury deadlock; 10 and, of course, whether jury
verdicts will be overturned or left in tact. 11 What the justices
think of juries, then, is a matter of importance.
This Article examines Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s view
of juries. A close reading of Blackmun’s opinions and of
opinions by other justices that Blackmun joined demonstrates
that Blackmun had a view of juries that, at least in modern
times, is unusual. Blackmun saw juries as important but not
for the typical reasons. He did not think juries were especially
remarkable as fact-finding bodies: juries, in his view, were not
needed to find facts accurately and, worse, they could easily get
facts wrong. Blackmun also did not think of juries in terms of
individual rights: he placed little emphasis on the criminal jury
trial as a right of defendants and he did not consider juries to
be in court principally to protect the defendant’s interests.
Instead, Blackmun saw juries primarily as an element
of democratic government. Here, too, Blackmun’s view was
unusual. Blackmun placed some stock—though not as much as
some of his other colleagues on the Court—in juries’ serving
democracy by preventing government overreaching and
protecting liberty. 12 But for Blackmun, the main democratic
10
See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (holding that
there was no error when a criminal jury returned for further instructions and the trial
court judge instructed the jurors that “if much the larger number were for conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made
no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with
himself,” and “[i]f . . . the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority”). The Court has stated that the propriety
of administering an Allen charge to a deadlocked jury is “beyond dispute.” Lowenfield
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988).
11
See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1994) (holding
that in the absence of sufficient alternative due process safeguards, state constitutional
provision preventing judicial review of the amount of punitive damages imposed by a
civil jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment unless the reviewing court could
affirmatively say there was no evidence to support the verdict); Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (“[A]lthough a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant [in
a criminal case] if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not
direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence”); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (“[T]he critical inquiry on [appellate] review of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”);
McCaughn v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 297 U.S. 606, 608 (1936) (stating
that in reviewing a civil jury’s verdict “[t]he appellate court cannot pass upon the
weight of [the] evidence” (citations omitted)); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 402 (1896)
(noting that an alleged assignment of error that “ask[ed the Court] to determine the
weight of proof . . . usurp[ed] the province of the [civil] jury”).
12
See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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benefit of the jury was as a participatory institution. 13 Like
voting, Blackman viewed serving on a jury as a right and a
responsibility of citizenship. 14 Blackmun therefore saw it as his
job, as a justice on the Supreme Court, to make sure that the
jury operated properly as a participatory democratic
institution. 15 In particular, whatever other rules the Supreme
Court might make about juries, it had to ensure at least that
juries were open to all citizens. 16
Parts II and III of the Article explore Blackmun’s
democratic view of juries.
Part II traces Blackmun’s
disagreement, expressed in a series of cases, with conventional
accounts of why juries are valuable. Part III examines
Blackmun’s own view of juries as robust sites of democratic
participation.
Understanding how Blackmun viewed juries does more
than shed light on the jurisprudence of a former member of the
Supreme Court. Taken seriously, Blackmun’s insights about
juries have important, and troubling, implications for the
present state of American democracy, the subject of Part IV. In
addition to pointing to some needed reforms in jury practices,
Blackmun’s approach suggests that the recent phenomenon of
the vanishing jury trial represents a disappearance of
democracy itself.
II.

THE VALUES OF JURIES

Why juries? Three reasons are commonly offered for
why juries are valuable. First, juries are good at finding facts:
twelve people who listen to evidence and then deliberate
together over what they have heard are more likely to get
things right than is a single fact-finder deciding an issue
alone. 17 Second, juries, particularly in criminal cases, serve as
13

See infra Part III.
See id.
15
See id.
16
See infra notes 85-147 and accompanying text.
17
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777, 827 (2001) (“Juries consist of groups, and group deliberation might reduce
some illusions of judgment. . . . [For example, b]ecause groups usually remember more
of the relevant facts than individuals, group decision making can mitigate some of the
hindsight bias’s influence, suggesting that juries might more successfully avoid the
hindsight bias than judges.” (footnote omitted)); Saul Levmore, From Cynicism to
Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 & n.1 (2002) (describing
the Condorcet Jury Theorem as stating that “a large number of observers will do better
than any non-expert individuals, so that it is comforting to be part of a group because
14
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a check on the government: criminal juries watch out for the
rights and interests of the individual defendant, and, as a
result, safeguard liberty more generally by shielding other
Third, juries
people from future government abuses. 18
legitimize outcomes: the general public is more likely to
respect decisions reached by ordinary citizens. In civil cases,
verdicts reflect the views of the community; a jury verdict in a
criminal case is fair because it is the decision of the defendant’s
peers. 19
Consider, then, what Justice Blackmun thought of these
three rationales. Justice Blackmun clearly did not think the
reason for having juries was that they accurately find facts.
Three important cases illustrate Blackmun’s view on this issue:
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 20 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania
(1974), 21 and Ludwig v. Massachusetts (1976). 22
In McKeiver, the Supreme Court held that there is no
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to a jury trial in a state court juvenile delinquency
Writing for a plurality, Justice Blackmun
proceeding. 23
avoided the question of whether a juvenile proceeding is a
the group can correct the misimpressions of the individuals”); Michael J. Saks, Book
Review: Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 706-07 (1986) (reviewing VALERIE P. HANS
& NEIL WIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986)) (writing that studies “give[] us reason to
wonder if juries will not be superior to judges in complex cases” including because the
“jury represents the reliable middle ground between judges who will range from
excellent to poor at complex factfinding” (footnotes omitted)).
18
See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (stating that
trial by jury “‘guard[s] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers’”
and is “‘the great bulwark of civil and political liberties’” (quoting 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th Ed. 1873)));
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (stating that “the purpose of the jury trial
in criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression and, in criminal and civil cases,
to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government.”).
19
See, e.g., Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity and Jury
Composition: Battering and Bolstering Diversity, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1033, 1039
(2003) (“To the extent that the jury legitimizes the verdict to the public, it builds public
confidence in the legal system as a whole.”); Nancy Gertner, Book Review: Is the Jury
Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)) (“[The jury] make[s]
critical, and presumably accurate, decisions about central social issues, at the same
time that it legitimizes those decisions by providing for the most representative lay
participation.”); Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 873, 884 (2002) (“Juries powerfully help to legitimize judicial activity.”).
20
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
21
418 U.S. 506 (1974).
22
427 U.S. 618 (1976).
23
403 U.S. at 551.
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criminal proceeding for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial and he wrote instead that while juveniles are
entitled to a fact-finding process that comports with due
process, due process itself does not require fact-finding to be
conducted by a jury. 24 “[O]ne cannot say,” Blackmun explained,
“that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of
accurate factfinding. There is much to be said for it, to be sure,
but we . . . [are] content to pursue other ways for determining
facts.” 25 Elsewhere, Blackmun noted that the jury performs “no
particular magic.” 26 In other words, a process can be a fair
process, and produce accurate results, even when a jury is not a
part of the proceeding. 27
Moreover, Blackmun reasoned, in juvenile proceedings,
not only will a jury be unnecessary to accurately find facts,
something that can be done perfectly well by a judge, a jury in
such cases will have a negative effect: the jury will turn the
juvenile court into a full-blown adversarial proceeding,
undermining the role of the juvenile court in protecting and
nurturing young people. 28 The jury, then, is not needed to find
facts and will likely only get in the way.
In Codispoti, the Court, in a majority opinion by Justice
White, held that following the verdict, a criminal defendant
facing contempt charges for conduct during the course of a trial
is entitled to a jury under the Sixth Amendment if the
aggregate sentence for the contempt charges exceeds six
months. 29 Dissenting from the majority’s extension of the Sixth
24
Id. at 543-45. The case involved two juveniles from Pennsylvania: Joseph
McKeiver, aged sixteen, was charged in family court with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods. Id. at 534-35. Rejecting his request for a jury trial, the judge
found him to be a juvenile delinquent and ordered probation. Id. at 535 & 558
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Fifteen-year old Edward Terry, charged with assault and
battery on a police officer and conspiracy, also sought a jury trial. Id. at 535 (majority
opinion). Again denying the request, the judge determined Terry was a delinquent and
ordered him committed to a home for youths. Id. A companion case decided from
North Carolina heard along with McKeiver involved a group of Black children charged
with disorderly conduct for protesting schooling conditions—also adjudged delinquents
without the benefit of a jury trial. Id. at 536-38. The state judge in that case ordered
the children in the custody of the state Department of Welfare but suspended the order
on the condition that the children refrain from further infractions, report monthly to a
welfare officer, and attend school without further disruption. Id. at 537-38.
25
Id. at 543. Blackmun explained: “Juries are not required, and have not
been, for example, in equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in probate, or in
deportation cases. Neither have they been generally used in military trials.” Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 547.
29
418 U.S. at 514-18.
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Amendment jury right, Blackmun saw no reason why a judge,
acting alone, cannot determine whether the defendant is guilty
of contempt as a result of conduct during the course of the
trial. 30 Blackmun wrote: “the contempt [takes] place in open
court and the incident and all its details are fully preserved on
the trial record.” 31 A judge, then, can review the record and
make appropriate findings of fact. 32 Blackmun reasoned that
any bias on the part of the trial judge could be dealt with by
assigning the contempt case to a new judge. 33 Blackmun
therefore stated that he was “at a loss . . . to see the role a jury
is to perform.” 34 More generally, Blackmun urged, “[t]he
determination of whether basically undisputed facts constitute
a direct criminal contempt is a particularly inappropriate task
for the jury,” and the job should instead be “the exclusive
province of the court.” 35 Blackmun reasoned that since the jury
would not be responsible for determining the sentence on the
contempt charges, there was nothing it could ever do to
“mitigat[e] an excessive punishment.” 36 Hence, the jury was
not needed. 37
Even in a straight-up criminal trial, Blackmun did not
consider a jury essential to accurate fact-finding. In our third
case, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, decided in 1976, Blackmun
stated in his majority opinion that “[t]here is no
question . . . that a person who is accused of crime may receive
a fair trial before a magistrate or a judge.” 38 Accordingly, in
Ludwig, Blackmun held constitutional a two-tier criminal
system in Massachusetts in which a defendant is tried in the
first tier before a judge, but is entitled to appeal a conviction to
the second tier and be tried there de novo by a jury. 39 Brushing
30

Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 522-23.
34
Id. at 522.
35
Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 523.
36
Id. at 523.
37
By contrast, twenty years later, Blackmun held for a unanimous court that
a union could not be held in contempt for violating a labor injunction and fined in the
amount of $52 million without the benefit of a jury trial. International Union, United
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839 (1994). The fine, Blackmun reasoned (in
part of his opinion joined by six other justices), was punitive rather than compensatory
and while not all criminal contempt fines require a jury trial, here the magnitude of
the amount made it a serious criminal sanction and triggered the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 837-38 & n.5.
38
427 U.S. at 627 n.3.
39
Id. at 631-32.
31
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aside the petitioner’s arguments—that the Massachusetts
system burdens the defendant with delay, expense and
inconvenience; subjects the defendant to the risk of a harsher
sentence if tried a second time and convicted at the second tier;
and is a form of double jeopardy—Blackmun reasoned that the
availability of a jury, even if only after the first trial ran its
course, satisfied the Constitution’s requirements. 40
Justice Blackmun, thus, did not place much stock in the
commonly held view that juries are valuable because they are
good at finding facts. How about the second reason frequently
offered in support of juries—their value in keeping government
in check and protecting liberty? Blackmun’s colleague, Byron
White, was enthusiastic about juries as a curb on government
power, and Blackmun joined opinions by White explaining how
juries exist as a safeguard against arbitrary government
action. For example, in 1972, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 41 the Court
affirmed three defendants’ state felony convictions following
non-unanimous verdicts (as permitted under state law)—
eleven-to-one verdicts in the cases of two of the defendants and
a ten-to-two verdict in the other. 42 Blackmun joined White’s
plurality opinion in Apodaca concluding that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a unanimous twelve-person jury
verdict because unanimity does not “materially contribute” to
the “purpose of trial by jury . . . to prevent oppression by the
Government” by “interpos[ing] between the accused and his
accuser . . . the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen.” 43
Ten jurors agreeing on an outcome, held the plurality, is
enough commonsense to protect liberty. 44
Yet, despite Apodaca, Blackmun placed less importance
than did White on the role of juries in curbing government
overreaching.
In Codispoti, White understood that the
arbitrary exercise of government power, the thing the jury
exists to prevent, might be the exercise of power by the trial
judge—who is, of course, a government employee. Giving the
case to the jury, White stated, reduces “the likelihood of
arbitrary action” that exists when the judge, after the trial is
40
Id. at 624-32. In other cases, Blackmun also pointed out that juries were
prone to make mistakes. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926-27 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing how jurors are easily misled by scientific
evidence).
41
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
42
Id. at 405-06, 414.
43
Id. at 410.
44
Id. at 411.
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over, is able to file a series of contempt charges and that same
judge, or another judge in the same building, determines guilt
or innocence on those contempt charges and imposes a sentence
that might run several years.” 45
Indeed, by dissenting from White’s opinion, Blackmun
did not appear to recognize the general resemblance Codispoti
bore to the most famous instance of juries protecting liberties:
the prosecution of John Peter Zenger in New York in 1735 on
charges of seditious libel for having published in his newspaper
criticisms of corrupt New York Governor William Cosby. 46 In
the Zenger trial, the court instructed the jury that the only
thing for it to do was to decide, as a factual matter, whether the
defendant published the newspapers in question and, if so,
return a verdict of guilty. 47 Rejecting the argument of Andrew
Hamilton, Zenger’s Philadelphia lawyer, that the jury should
also decide whether the offending newspapers were libelous
and whether the defense of truth applied, the court stated that
it would determine—if the jury found Zenger published the
materials—whether they were libelous, and, if they were,
impose an appropriate sentence. 48 Zenger had admitted he
published the newspapers and so a guilty verdict seemed
inevitable in the case. 49 Yet the jury, present in the courtroom
throughout the exchanges between the judge and Hamilton,
returned an acquittal. 50 Despite its limited mandate, the
Zenger jury protected the right to publish from an abusive
government.
So too in Codispoti (and other cases involving charges of
criminal contempt) the jury might serve to protect liberty.
Though the jury would see the defendant’s misconduct on the
record, and though the evidence of criminal contempt might be
overwhelmingly clear, the jury might nonetheless acquit. It
might conclude, for example, that the government—in the form
of the angry trial judge—had gone too far in seeking contempt
sanctions. It might decide that a finding of contempt would be
unfair. It might oppose the government having a second
chance to incarcerate a defendant.
Viewed from the
45

Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974).
See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER (1736), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/zenger.htm.
47
Id. at 29.
48
Id. at 18-19.
49
Id. at 12.
50
Id. at 30.
46
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perspective of the Zenger case, Blackmun overlooked the
important safeguard to liberty juries might offer in these
circumstances.
A third common rationale for the jury system is that
juries lend legitimacy to verdicts. Blackmun also did not seem
to consider this to be the importance of the jury. For one,
Blackmun plainly saw a significant role for the judge in
keeping the jury in check. Blackmun wrote the majority
opinion in Smith v. United States, 51 holding that under the
provision of federal law prohibiting the mailing of obscene
materials, 52 and in accordance with Miller v. California, 53 it is
the job of the jury to apply the standards of its own community
to determine whether material is obscene. 54 At the same time,
Blackmun emphasized in Smith, judges had an important role
in monitoring the jury’s work. The trial judge should ensure
that jurors are “instructed properly, so that they consider the
entire community and not simply their own subjective
reactions, or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous
minority.” 55 Blackmun further instructed that judges also
should determine if the material falls within the substantive
limits of Miller 56 and noted that an issue “particularly
amenable to appellate review” in obscenity cases was the Miller
prong that asks whether the material had redeeming literary,
More generally,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 57
Blackmun wrote, “it is always appropriate for the appellate
court to review the sufficiency of the evidence.” 58 Hence, juries
bring the voice of the community to the courtroom—but the
judge decides how strong that voice will be.
It comes, then, as no surprise that Blackmun was the
author of the Court’s Daubert opinion, holding that under the
51
52
53

431 U.S. 291 (1977).
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000).
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller held that material can be obscene only if:

(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 25.
54
55
56
57
58

Smith, 431 U.S. at 304-05.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305-06.
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Federal Rules of Evidence, before expert scientific testimony is
presented to a jury the trial judge must make a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can be
applied to the facts at issue in the case. 59 While recognizing
that this gatekeeping role of judges “inevitably on occasion will
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and
innovations,” Blackmun explained that evidentiary rules are
“designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.” 60
Blackmun’s skepticism towards the value that juries
hold in lending legitimacy to verdicts can also be seen in his
death penalty jurisprudence.
Every death penalty case
receives enormous public attention and presents an especially
strong risk that its outcome will be perceived as illegitimate,
particularly because the cost of error is so high. While
Blackmun would ultimately conclude capital punishment was
unconstitutional, 61 in the earlier cases in which he voted to
uphold a capital sentence, he did not think that a jury had to
be entrusted with the task of deciding whether death was an
appropriate penalty. In 1984, in Spaziano v. Florida, 62 Justice
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion holding that no
constitutional violation occurs if, in accordance with state law,
the trial judge in a first-degree murder case overrides the jury’s
recommendation of life imprisonment and imposes a death
sentence. 63 In Spaziano, the judge, as required under the
Florida statute, independently found that there existed
aggravating circumstances—the murder was heinous and
atrocious and the defendant had committed a prior violent
felony—that justified ignoring the jury’s decision and imposing
a capital sentence. 64 Blackmun saw no problem with judges
ignoring a jury’s decision in these circumstances. He explained
that “a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same
fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing
proceeding—a determination of the appropriate punishment to
59

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
Id. at 597.
61
See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death.”).
62
468 U.S. 447 (1984).
63
Id. at 449.
64
Id. at 451-52.
60

46

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

be imposed on an individual,” and that this was an issue to
which the Sixth Amendment jury right simply does not apply. 65
The Constitution, Blackmun reasoned, mandates only that a
capital sentencing scheme be generally in accordance with the
“twin objectives” of “measured, consistent application and
fairness to the accused.” 66 A judge having the final word
comports with those requirements: “Nothing in those twin
objectives suggests that the sentence must or should be
imposed by a jury.” 67
Blackmun was not persuaded by the petitioner’s
arguments that the “[t]he imposition of the death penalty . . . is
an expression of community outrage,” that jurors are “in the
best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous
that the community’s response must be death,” and that the
decision of the jury should therefore be final, 68 points pressed
by Justice Stevens. 69 Instead, Blackmun reasoned, the state
legislature, in creating the particular death penalty scheme in
the first place, had already given voice to the concerns of the
community. 70 Legitimacy, in other words, derived from the
statute itself. Though assuring readers that his opinion “do[es]
not denigrate the significance of the jury’s role as a link
between the community and the penal system and as a
bulwark between the accused and the State,” 71 Blackmun
concluded that the Constitution permits judges, in accordance
with the state’s own laws, to ignore the jury’s recommendation:
“advice,” he wrote, “does not become a judgment simply
because it comes from the jury.” 72 Moreover, if the sentencing
judge’s determination is irrational or arbitrary, there remains
the possibility of correction on appeal. 73 Blackmun believed
that even in capital cases, in which legitimacy seems most
crucial, juries could be displaced.
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Id. at 459.
Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982)).
Id. at 460.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461.
Id. at 481-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 462 (majority opinion).
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THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY

Though Justice Blackmun placed little emphasis on
juries as accurate fact finders, guardians of liberty, and a
source of legitimacy, he nonetheless valued juries—for a
different reason. Blackmun considered juries an important
component of democracy. In this view, juries matter because
they represent an opportunity for citizens to participate in the
workings of government. Like voting, jury service is a right
and obligation of citizenship. Juries in this sense promote
liberty, but not so much because any particular jury keeps the
government in check or a jury watches out for the interests of a
particular defendant. Rather, juries safeguard liberty because
they are an aspect of a functioning democracy. The job of the
Supreme Court, then, is to ensure juries are open for and
conducive to participation—just as the Court safeguards the
ability of citizens to vote.
Under this approach, juries must function as
participatory bodies.
A series of Supreme Court cases
considered how the numerical composition of a jury affects its
ability to function. In 1978, in Ballew v. Georgia, 74 Blackmun
wrote for the Court in holding that a five-member jury in a
criminal case violated the Sixth Amendment. 75 The jury’s
democratic purpose, Blackmun wrote, is only achieved by “the
participation of the community in determinations of guilt
and . . . the application of the common sense of laymen.” 76 In
1970 (before Justice Blackmun’s tenure) the Court had held in
Williams v. Florida that a jury comprised of six citizens is
constitutional. 77 Why then, were six jurors permissible in
Williams while in Ballew five jurors were not? Citing a vast
body of scholarly work on jury size prepared in the wake of
Williams, 78 Blackmun concluded that a series of problems
emerge if the number of jurors drops below six. Small-sized
groups do not function well as deliberative bodies, Blackmun
concluded. 79 Collectively, the members of very small groups
have less reliable recall of evidence compared to larger groups;
very small groups do not effectively solve problems; biases of
74
75
76
77
78
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435 U.S. 223 (1978).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
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individuals are not tempered in small groups; minority
viewpoints are also less likely to be asserted because
individuals are reluctant to articulate views if nobody else in
the group shares the view; and very small groups of decisionmakers produce inaccurate results. 80 Moreover, Blackmun
emphasized, as the size of the jury decreases, its benefit as a
site of community participation naturally declines 81 in that the
“opportunity for meaningful and appropriate representation . . .
decrease[s] with the size of the panel[].” 82
Consistent with his approach to jury size and
deliberation in Ballew, in 1979, Blackmun joined Rehnquist’s
opinion in Burch v. Louisiana, holding that a non-unanimous
six-person jury was unconstitutional. 83 In 1980, in Brown v.
Louisiana, Blackmun also joined Brennan’s opinion—which
itself drew heavily on Ballew—in holding that the Burch rule
applied retroactively. 84
Because juries are sites of democratic participation,
Blackmun further saw his job as ensuring that jury
participation is available to all citizens. As a judge on the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Blackmun had already
issued an important ruling on the unconstitutionality of
excluding Black citizens from juries. In 1961, in Bailey v.
Henslee, 85 Circuit Judge Blackmun held that the Equal
Protection Clause required granting a habeas petitioner from
Arkansas a new trial following his conviction by an all-White
jury, and death sentence, when the method for selecting jurors
involved jury commissioners who handpicked the jurors; the
jurors’ race was notated in the records; Black jurors rarely
served; and there was a recurrence in jury pools of the same
few Black citizens who would likely be disqualified. 86 “When a
right to a jury trial exists,” Circuit Judge Blackmun wrote, “a
jury’s proper composition is fundamental.” 87
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447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980). Note that in Apodaca, Justice White, in an
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At the Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 88
Blackmun joined White’s opinion holding that a male criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is violated when, in
accordance with state law, women were called for jury service
only if they have previously filed a declaration indicating they
want to serve—a system that resulted in a very small number
of women in the jury pool. 89 If juries are to protect against
arbitrary governmental power, White reasoned, the jury pool
must reflect a fair cross-section of the population. 90 White
noted also in Taylor that “[c]ommunity participation in the
administration of the criminal law” is part of “our democratic
heritage.” 91 A jury representative of the community, White
stated, ensures “diffused impartiality,” and that the “civic
responsibility” of “administ[ering] . . . justice” is “shar[ed].” 92
Solidifying this approach, in 1977, Blackmun wrote the
majority opinion in Castaneda v. Partida, 93 a habeas case, in
which the Court found a Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection violation when a defendant had been indicted by a
Texas grand jury selected through an exclusionary process. 94
Under the key-man system in place in Texas, a state judge
appointed three to five persons to serve as jury commissioners;
they in turn selected fifteen to twenty individuals from the
county to make up the list from which the grand jury was
drawn. 95 Blackmun held that the petitioner had made out a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination in the grand jury
selection by showing that in a county in which 79.1% of the
population was Mexican-American, only 39% of people
summoned for grand jury service over an 11-year period were
Mexican-American. 96 Blackmun also held that the state’s claim
that Mexican-Americans constituted a majority of elected
officials in the county was insufficient evidence to rebut the
prima facie showing. 97 Equal protection requires inclusiveness
in choosing grand juries as well as petit juries.
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419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Id. at 525-26, 533.
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Id. at 530-31 (citation omitted).
430 U.S. 482 (1977).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 486-91, 494-96.
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Two cases decided in 1979 further demonstrate
Blackmun’s commitment toward ensuring jury inclusiveness.
In Duren v. Missouri, Blackmun joined White again to hold
that a Missouri statute that granted women automatic
exemption from jury service, thereby producing underrepresentation of women on jury venires, violated the
That same year,
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 98
Blackmun wrote for a majority in Rose v. Mitchell, 99 holding
that racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause in the selection of a grand jury is a basis for setting
aside a criminal conviction, even when the verdict is reached by
a properly constituted petit jury, and, further, that the issue
can be raised in a federal habeas petition. 100 The case involved
two Black defendants convicted in Tennessee of murder who
claimed in their habeas petitions that the grand jury array,
appointed through a key-man system in which three jury
commissioners compiled a list of potential jurors, and the grand
jury foreperson, appointed by the county court, had been
selected in a racially discriminatory manner. 101 After an
evidentiary hearing, the federal district court dismissed the
petitions on the ground that no showing of discrimination had
been made. 102 The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of
the selection of the jury foreperson, and vacated the
convictions, and the Supreme Court granted review on that
same issue. 103
In his opinion in Rose, Blackmun wrote that “[f]or
nearly a century, this Court in an unbroken line of cases has
held that ‘a criminal conviction of a [Black defendant] cannot
stand under the Equal Protection Clause if it is based on an
indictment of a grand jury from which [Blacks] were excluded
by reason of their race.’” 104 Shoring up this precedent,
Blackmun located inclusiveness in grand juries at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection:
“Discrimination on account of race . . . [is] the primary evil at
which the . . . Fourteenth Amendment . . . [is] aimed,” and such
discrimination is “especially pernicious in the administration of
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

439 U.S. 357, 366-68 (1979).
443 U.S. 545 (1979).
Id. at 560-61, 564.
Id. at 547-48 & n.2.
Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551 (citing, inter alia, Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881)).
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justice.” 105 Grand jury participation was, in Blackmun’s view,
an element of democracy: “[t]he harm [of discrimination] is not
only to the accused, indicted as he is by a jury from which a
segment of the community has been excluded. It is to society
as a whole.” 106 Such discrimination, Blackmun reasoned, is “at
war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government” and it causes injury to “the law as
an institution . . . and to the democratic ideal reflected in the
processes of our courts.” 107 To Blackmun, exclusion from a
grand jury cut so deeply into the democratic fabric that it was a
denial of equal protection in the plainest sense.
Precisely because the problem of exclusion lay at the
core of equal protection and of democracy itself, Blackmun
rejected the argument, one first advanced by Justice Jackson in
a 1950 dissent 108 and urged in Rose by Justice Stewart, that so
long as the trial itself was not defective, an improperly
constituted grand jury could not be a basis for invalidating a
conviction. 109 Blackmun also rejected the state’s argument in
Rose that, following Stone v. Powell 110 —in which the Court,
with Blackmun in the majority, had held that where the state
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner can not be granted
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
through an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced
at trial—because the trial itself was not defective, there should
exist no habeas relief. 111 Blackmun wrote in Rose that “a claim
of discrimination . . . differs . . . fundamentally” from a claimed
violation of the Fourth Amendment because “[a]llegations of
grand jury discrimination involve charges that state officials
are violating the direct command of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 112 Hence, Blackmun stated, the claim is properly
presented in a habeas petition. 113 The individual defendants in
105

Rose, 443 U.S. at 554-55.
Id. at 556.
107
Id.
108
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Rose were not, however, home free. Reviewing the evidentiary
record generated below, Blackmun disagreed with the Court of
Appeals that the grand jury selection was defective and he
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination. 114 The habeas petition
therefore had to be denied. 115
In the ensuing years, Blackmun’s view of juries as
participatory
institutions
important
to
democracy
116
strengthened. In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, Blackmun was
in the majority holding that in a criminal trial the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the prosecutor from using
peremptory challenges to remove panelists on the basis of their
race, 117 and that the defendant may establish a prima facie case
of discrimination based on the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges. 118 Blackmun also dissented in two significant cases
in which the majority refused to extend Batson. In 1990,
Blackmun dissented in Holland v. Illinois, 119 in which the
majority held that while the use of peremptory challenges to
exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race violates the
Equal Protection Clause, it does not violate the Sixth
Amendment’s right to an impartial jury (the only argument the
defendant in the case had raised at trial). 120 In 1991, Blackmun
dissented in Hernandez v. New York, 121 in which the majority
found no Batson violation in excluding Latino jurors on the
ground that they might not accept the translator’s version of
Spanish-language testimony. 122 So too, in 1991, Blackmun
joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Powers v. Ohio,
holding that the Batson equal protection principle applies
whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror are of the
same race, so that in the trial of a White criminal defendant
the prosecutor is prohibited from excluding Black jurors on the
basis of their race. 123 Blackmun also joined Kennedy’s majority
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opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 124 holding that
equal protection also prohibits the use of peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in civil trials. 125
When civil parties in court exercise peremptory challenges,
Kennedy held, they engage in state action: “If a government
confers on a private body the power to choose the government’s
employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the
constitutional mandate of race neutrality.” 126 On this view,
race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the
excluded juror and the opposing party in the case has standing
to challenge the exclusion. 127
In 1992, in Georgia v. McCollum, 128 Blackmun, writing
for a majority, extended the principle to the defendants in
criminal trials, holding that they too are prohibited from
exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, 129
and that the prosecutor is entitled to assert the equal
protection rights of the excluded juror to challenge a
defendant’s decision. 130 Whether a potential juror is excluded
by the state or by the defendant, Blackmun reasoned, “the
harm is the same—in . . . [each] case[] the juror is subjected to
open and public racial discrimination,” 131 and the racially
discriminatory selection procedure “undermine[s] . . . public
confidence” in the judicial process. 132 Blackmun held that a
criminal defendant’s use of peremptory challenges is, like the
prosecutor’s, state action. 133 He reasoned that state action
exists because the peremptory challenge is a right established
by state law; 134 the jury process in general is a function of the
government, which summons prospective jurors, administers to
them an oath, and pays them a stipend; 135 the jury in a criminal
case performs a function—trial by jury—required by the
Constitution; 136 and the public views the jury process as a
124
125
126
127
128
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130
131
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133
134
135
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505 U.S. 42 (1992).
Id. at 50-55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 51-56.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51.
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governmental process. 137 The fact that the defendant is on trial
by the government does not undermine the conclusion that the
defendant is the government when it comes to picking jurors. 138
Further, Blackmun found, applying the Equal Protection
Clause to constrain the defendant’s exercise of peremptory
challenges does not interfere with the defendant’s own right to
a jury trial because all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
is the right to “trial by an impartial jury.” 139
The holding seems astonishing: the criminal defendant,
the individual experiencing the fullest power of the state and
mustering every resource to prevent what the state seeks to do,
is, according to Blackmun, an agent of the government itself.
Justice O’Connor, in dissent, calls the result “perverse.” 140 And
yet if the jury is a site of democracy, the holding makes perfect
sense. The jury does not exist for the benefit of the defendant
but, rather, as an opportunity for citizen participation.
Democracy therefore requires a response to efforts, including
those by the defendant, to prevent citizens from participating
fully.
Democracy does not only mean equal participation on
juries regardless of race. In 1994, Blackmun also wrote the
majority opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 141 holding
that equal protection rules likewise apply to prohibit the use of
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 142 “[W]hether the
trial is criminal or civil,” Blackmun wrote, “potential jurors, as
well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury
selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.” 143
Treating the exclusion of women from juries as inconsistent
with their right to vote, 144 and at odds with “the value of
women’s contribution to civic life,” 145 Blackmun explained that
women have suffered a similar plight as Blacks because, “with
137
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respect to jury service . . . [both groups] share a history of total
exclusion.” 146 Using peremptory challenges to deny women an
equal opportunity to serve on juries undermines their full
participation in political life and renders them unequal
citizens. Blackmun wrote:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice
is fundamental to our democratic system. . . . It reaffirms the
promise of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of
race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in
our democracy. . . . When persons are excluded from participation in
our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is
jeopardized. 147

Exclusion of citizens from juries represents a defect in the very
operations of democracy.
IV.

CONCLUSION: MODERN LESSONS

Blackmun’s understanding of juries as sites of political
participation, though perhaps unusual in modern times, 148
turns out to be an old idea. Blackmun’s view would be familiar
to eighteenth-century Americans. Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist identified the need to protect juries as an important
component of American democracy and the single point of
agreement among the diverse delegates to the Constitutional
Convention: all of the convention delegates, Hamilton says,
understood juries to be the “very palladium of free
government.” 149 The anti-federalist author of the 1788 Essays
by a Farmer identified juries as “the democratic branch of the
judiciary power.” 150 Thomas Jefferson thought juries were
more central to democracy than was the legislature, writing in
1789 that “[w]ere I called upon to decide whether the people
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CONSTITUTION 5, 15 (2005).
149
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had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department,
I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.” 151
Alexis de Tocqueville also understood the participatory
benefits of juries when he observed in the 1830s that “[t]he jury
is both the most effective way of establishing the people’s rule
and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule.” 152
According to Tocqueville, “juries . . . instill some of the habits of
the judicial mind into every citizen, and just those habits are
the very best way of preparing people to be free.” 153 Indeed,
consistent with this view of juries as sites of democracy, in the
early years of the Republic, instead of simply deciding welldefined issues of fact, jurors also interpreted and applied the
law. 154
What might it mean to take seriously today the idea
that juries are important because they are sites of democratic
participation? One implication is that the recent phenomenon,
demonstrated by Marc Galanter and others, of the “vanishing”
jury trial represents a significant erosion of democracy itself.
In twenty-two state courts for which reliable data are
available, between 1976 and 2002, the number of criminal
cases decided by juries dropped from 42,000 cases out of 1.22
million cases, to fewer than 36,000 out of 2.78 million cases; in
other words, a decline of juries in 3.4% of criminal cases in
1976 to 1.3% of criminal cases in 2002. 155 In federal court
today, juries resolve fewer than 3,000 cases out of the more
than 75,000 criminal cases filed, about 4%. 156 Civil juries are
also disappearing. While the civil-case load of the federal
courts increased five-fold between 1962 and 2004, the number
151
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of civil jury trials increased only modestly, from 2,765 to 3,006
trials over the same period. 157 In state courts, the absolute
number of civil jury trials was one-third less in 2002 than it
was in 1976. 158 Each of these developments means that fewer
and fewer Americans today have opportunities to participate
on juries.
Whatever the efficiencies of deciding cases without them
going to jury trial, the decline of juries is a startling
development. Eighteenth-century Americans would consider a
criminal jury trial rate of 4% as bizarre as Americans today
would view a proposal to select just four United States senators
through elections and the remaining 96 by, say, a Senatorial
Selection Committee appointed by the President. Or, put it
this way: fewer than 40,000 juries deciding criminal matters
today is equivalent—at a rate of twelve jurors per trial—to
fewer than a half million citizens voting in national elections.
If Blackmun is right about the participatory value of juries, it
is democracy itself that is vanishing.
A second implication, suggested by Blackmun’s opinion
in Ballew, is the need for greater attention to the size of juries,
and how size promotes or undermines participatory
opportunities. Ballew, citing social science research on group
dynamics, tell us that juries comprised of fewer than six jurors
do not work well as deliberative bodies. 159 If six is the smallest
size that does not lose participatory benefits, what is the
largest sized jury that still works properly as a site of
democracy? Are twelve jurors—an accident of history—the
right number? Are there possibilities for increasing juries
beyond twelve without undermining their benefits? The issue
matters for purposes of securing and increasing opportunities
for jury service today. When the number of juries called into
action drops, making juries bigger may be one way to increase
participation.
In this same vein, Blackmun’s participatory theory of
juries suggests that recent work by Robert Putnam and others
tracking the disengagement of Americans, over the course of
the past generation, from politics and other aspects of civic life
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may be incomplete. 160 Putnam presents a supply-side account
of civic decline: Americans, increasingly consumed with private
pursuits, have retreated from various forms of public
participation. 161 The evidence on juries suggests demand-side
explanations may be more salient. On this account, Americans
do not participate in an important democratic institution, the
jury, because with judges, lawyers and other professionals
taking over their work, the services of ordinary people in the
judicial system are no longer needed.
Third, the democratic account of the jury suggests the
need to think more broadly and creatively about the things
juries might be entrusted to do—particularly in an age in
which we do not ask them very frequently to decide cases at
trial. Juries might continue to contribute to democracy by
playing a role in sentencing proceedings, in mediation and
settlement, in discovery and other pre-trial disputes, and in the
examination and acceptance of guilty pleas. 162 So, too, jury-like
panels outside of traditional courts—for example, community
courts, drug courts, youth courts—represent additional
participatory opportunities for citizens.
Fourth, a participatory account of juries suggests, as
Blackmun recognizes in McKeiver, Ludwig, and McCollum,
that, in considering the uses, operations, and arrangements of
juries, we, as a society, should focus less on how litigants want
juries to look and function. Our present system allows litigants
in civil and criminal cases to forego jury trial altogether. When
juries are used, litigants, along with the judge, also exercise
considerable control over them: deciding what they will hear,
whether they can take notes, when they can come and go, what
issues they will decide, and even when they can go to lunch or
take a bathroom break. A participatory account of juries
suggests the need to align juries less with the demands and
wishes of litigants and focus instead on ensuring juries
enhance democracy.
On that score, the jury as democracy suggests the need
to end the practice of peremptory challenges—a point Justice

160
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Marshall had suggested in Batson, 163 and Justice O’Connor also
raised in the J.E.B. case. 164 There are, after all, no peremptory
challenges at the ballot box so it is reasonable to ask why, if
jurors are like voters, we tolerate peremptory strikes in the
jury box. Challenges for cause make sense: even some citizens
are not permitted to vote (denying the vote to felons, for
example, can be seen as a for-cause exclusion). However, when
juries are meant to be open for all citizens to participate,
litigants should not be permitted to decide that some citizens
should not play a role.
Fifth, the participatory account of juries suggests also
that the measure of successful jury performance should not be
the accuracy of verdicts. Again, a comparison to voting is
instructive. When elections are over, we may, and often do,
wonder whether the voters have made wise choices. But
nobody asks whether voters in an election have made
“accurate” choices. So, too, we should be less obsessed with
juror accuracy, and more appreciative of juries for their
contributions to democracy.
Finally, the participatory theory of juries suggests, as
Blackmun understood, an important role for judges to ensure
juries properly fulfill their democratic function. In many ways,
judges can and should monitor and structure the jury process—
ensuring juries are open, making sure jurors understand their
task, even reviewing their work. Just as judges have long
played a role in correcting the undemocratic features of
election, so too, judges can make sure democracy is served
when citizens cast their votes in the jury room.
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
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ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.”).
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